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Global Health Governance: International Law and Public Health in a Divided
World. By Obijiofor Aginam. Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2005. Pp. xi, 202. Price: $60.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Assia
Dosseva.
Obijiofor Aginam, a renowned Nigerian lawyer and scholar, explores the
role of international law in protecting the right to health in Global Health
Governance. In this highly insightful but imperfect work, Aginam coins the
term "communitarian globalism" to argue for an inclusive multilateral health
framework of international institutions, state actors, NGOs, and civil society,
which would redistribute the burden of dealing with disease from
underdeveloped to developed nations at a time when globalization is turning
the world into a single germ pool. Mutual vulnerability, the author asserts,
will engage all nations' self-interest and help combat global diseases more
effectively.
Global Health Governance provides a comprehensive review of the
relevant scholarship in the field and offers a holistic approach to global health
policy. The book's constructive critique of the existing tools of global health
governance reflects a deep understanding of the infrastructure and functioning
of multilateral institutions, as well as awareness of the complexities involved
in global health management. If market-driven global civilization, as Richard
Falk argues, is a "dystopian result of globalism-from-above," then the author
says the solution is to adopt a bottom-up approach-"globalization-from-
below" involving "an effective integration of sustainable indigenous practices
in the development process" (p. 43).
The crux of Aginam's communitarian globalism is a proposal for
collaboration between the World Bank and a variety of United Nations
programs, culminating in a Global Health Fund. He takes the existing network
of partnerships between the World Health Organization (WHO) and various
United Nations organizations, initiatives and programs, and aims to combine
their expertise in addressing global health issues with the World Bank's
financial resources, legal know-how, and enormous influence in developing
countries. This joint project, the author claims, would redistribute the stakes
among various private and public actors and achieve "transparency and
accountability of these partnerships to the constituencies they serve" (p. 111).
Aginam's proposal for a global health fund-a multilateral "disease non-
proliferation facility"--combines realist, neo-liberal, and radical/critical
perspectives on global health governance (p. 70). However, the analysis
dominating the rest of the book is less well-balanced. By employing some
rigid categories from the radical/critical school, the author ignores major
inconsistencies in the school's theoretical underpinnings. His approach, in
turn, results in the neglect and oversimplification of problems warranting
more straightforward and detailed analysis. Aginam turns a blind eye to
statistical discrepancies in studies linking underdevelopment with disease,
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fails to address relevant factors that do affect development, and offers no
support for his proposals for alternative medicinal practices.
Aginam's analysis of world health problems is based on the rigid
separation of countries into "North" and "South." He connects the past and
present underdevelopment of the countries of the global South to their
colonial past, and ties the prevalence of diseases such as HIV, tuberculosis
(TB), and malaria to this underdevelopment. Unfortunately, this classification
ignores significant regions of the world that do not fit into the North/South
colonizer/colonized schema of disease prevalence. For example, the Russian
Federation, which according to Aginam's classification belongs to the global
North based on its colonial history, is plagued by HIV and TB at rates many
times higher than those of nearly all of the Eastern European and Central
Asian countries it colonized. In addition, the per capita GNP of almost all of
the former Russian and Soviet colonies is comparatively low, well below that
of the Russian Federation. This large statistical incongruity highlights the fact
that lack of development and colonial history does not necessarily correlate
with disease.
At best, the colonial heritage of the global South seems to be a partial
explanation for the failure of global health governance in many
underdeveloped countries. Aginam should have examined other factors
affecting the prevalence of HIV, TB, and other diseases. For example, Global
Health Governance does not even mention other relevant aspects of failed
international health initiatives such as poor management, high inflation,
pervasive corruption, crumbling infrastructure, ethnic/civil conflicts,
population displacement, excessive military spending, inequitable distribution
of resources, and chronic youth unemployment-major problems in many
underdeveloped countries. Perhaps the idea of "globalization-from-below"
should also include the idea of bottom-up eradication of corruption.
Throughout Global Health Governance, Aginam claims that the
integration of traditional medical and ethnopharmacological practices is a key
tool in the new approach to health governance. Yet he also finds that
globalization undermines this integration in underdeveloped countries.
Aginam acknowledges that the operation of a new Global Health Fund should
function on the principles of, inter alia, proven scientific and medical
effectiveness. Yet he provides no statistical evidence of medical effectiveness
of indigenous medical and ethnoparmacological practices. Instead, he
recommends "scientification" of indigenous healing practices, without
clarifying what such a process may entail but rejects "Western" scientific
methods. Such a dichotomous stance makes the proposal for integration of
local medical practices into the new global health governance difficult to
evaluate.
Aginam sees international law as a means of inducing states to act both
in recognition of their self-interest and for the benefit of the international
community. If developed countries recognize that the global epidemics
"threaten populations irrespective of national boundaries", the argument goes,
they would act to combat diseases outside of their territory, thereby alleviating
the onerous disease burden on underdeveloped countries (p. 88).
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Aginam fails, however, to address the most pertinent question facing his
proposal: given that nation-states have been aware of the danger of global
epidemics for decades (if not centuries), why would countries choose to
change their behavior now? A relevant discussion in this context would be the
'threat of bio-terrorism and how it might affect the behavior of nation-states.
Anthrax attacks in the United States have demonstrated that developed
countries are not immune to health-related national security emergencies.
Though the threat of bio-terrorism could arguably lead to further isolationism
of nation-states, reactions to the terrorist attacks in Madrid, London, and other
European cities indicate that the threat of terrorism has been generally
conducive to multilateral cooperation in spheres such as intelligence-gathering
and operational know-how. Perhaps under that rubric, the urgency of fighting
global health problems would sound more strongly.
Obijiofor Aginam offers a timely, sensible, and attainable global health
policy project in the form of a Global Health Fund. He shows a deep
understanding of the actors and factors relevant to the success of such a
project but stops short of exploring all aspects contributing to its dysfunction.
However, his unwillingness to address difficult political questions, and his
inclusion of unsubstantiated proposals for changes in global health policy
distract him from real problems. If implemented, these proposals might only
exacerbate those problems by diverting resources and energy. Global Health
Governance is a worthwhile but flawed effort.
Spreading America's Word: Stories of Its Lawyer Missionaries. By Paul D.
Carrington. New York: Twelve Tables Press, 2005. Pp. 392. Price:
$26.95 (Paperback). Reviewed by Phyllis Maloney.
Paul D. Carrington offers a timely history lesson in Spreading America's
Word: Stories of Its Lawyer-Missionaries. The book responds to President
Bush's 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
which declared ("as if for the first time," the author dryly remarks) that "the
United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of
freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring hope of democracy,
development, free markets and free trade to every comer of the world" (p. 6).
Carrington, professor and former dean at Duke University School of Law,
sees this rhetoric as a case of history repeating itself. He warns that the
current, largely neoconservative generation of legal evangelists should not
expect much success in its endeavor, given the mixed "record of those who
have tried to propagate the American ideology" throughout the nation's
history (p. 6). Carrington presents that record in an admirable attempt to
identify the methods of conversion that have proven most effective. In the
end, however, his enterprise meets with the same uneven results as the lawyer-
missionaries he writes about. Carrington's book suffers from an
overabundance of historical accounts with varying degrees of relevance to the
book's central analogy between past and present attempts to spread American
democracy. In the end, what could have been an engaging argument is lost in
a thicket of extraneous material.
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Carrington delivers a promising opening analysis, suggesting reasons
why proselytizing on behalf of democracy is harder than it looks. First, he
explains, such efforts have suffered from ambiguity stemming from two
contradictory ideas enshrined in the Declaration of Independence: popular
self-government and individual rights, especially property rights (p. 8).
Carrington suggests that many legal missionaries either do not know which
brand of American idealism they are preaching or alternatively try to export
the two together, failing to resolve their inherent tension. "This tension,"
Carrington observes, "is perhaps especially discomforting to evangelists
seeking to impart the notion that democracy and market capitalism are merely
two faces of a single truth about politics and economics" (p. 9). Carrington
also criticizes lawyer-missionaries for having often failed to overcome a
"chronic oversight ... of the dependence of law on its cultural roots," leading
them to underestimate the difficulties of self-government in nations divided by
class or ethnic identity (p. 10). Carrington notes that American legal
missionaries frequently forget that other peoples may regard them as
imperialists or braggarts rather than saviors bearing the enlightened gospel of
democracy. These propositions seem reasonable enough at the outset.
When the ride through history begins, however, Carrington fails to
deliver on his provocative exposition. The book moves at breakneck speed,
only rarely pausing to tender token analyses of the recounted events or link
them with the overall thesis of the book. In Chapters Two and Three,
Carrington rushes through American reactions to the French Revolution, the
War of 1812, political strife in mid-nineteenth century Europe, the Native
American experience after Independence, the establishment of Liberia, slavery
in America, and the Reconstruction of the South. The reader must discern
what she can from the blur of history passing by, as Carrington fails to
connect these episodes effectively to insights discussed at the book's opening.
More analysis is sorely needed, as several of the historical accounts
Carrington relates throughout the book bear little resemblance to the current
events which he initially cites as his inspiration. One wonders why he
included them at all. The title of the book indicates that it will discuss
"lawyer-missionaries," so it remains unclear why, for example, the author
includes episodes in which America, in response to the French Revolution,
recoiled from foreign entanglements and chose not to evangelize, or the period
between the World Wars at the beginning of the twentieth century. No doubt
Carrington saw lessons for today's America in all the events he recounts, but
he does not effectively share them with readers.
Carrington's account is most convincing when he examines events that
more closely mirror the Bush Administration's attempts "to extend the
benefits of freedom across the globe." For example, past endeavors in Cuba,
the Philippines, and Mexico were, like the current conflict in Iraq, official
campaigns of the American government involving military operations under
the banner of freedom. In Chapter Five, Carrington demonstrates how, "in the
effort to govern Cuba, America modified itself," just as it has in the struggle
to democratize Iraq (p. 85). He also highlights attitudes in the first Roosevelt
administration that portend those of today's war hawks, quoting an
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anonymous contemporary observer: "[The Roosevelt cabinet's] interpretation
of the national honor required that they should permit no nation to prevent
their doing what they wanted to do. Naturally, the corollary of militarism
could not be avoided" (p. 82). Chapter Six relates the divine revelations that
purportedly prompted President McKinley to intervene in the Philippines, a
conflict that included torture and abuse by American soldiers that are all too
familiar to the contemporary reader (pp. 92-93). Meanwhile, in Chapter Nine,
Carrington reports President Wilson as exclaiming, "I am going to teach the
South American republics to elect good men!" while sending Marines into
Mexico (p. 148). In these passages, the reader clearly sees today's legal
evangelical ventures acted out again and again, like a long-running play that
only changes its actors.
Perhaps the most trenchant analysis of the book appears in Chapter
Sixteen, when Carrington examines democracy-building in Japan and
Germany after World War II, proposing six reasons why these projects in
democratization succeeded where others fell short (p. 261). The rest of
Carrington's book would have benefited from such lucid and concise
commentary. One wonders if concentrating on a few choice examples from
history would have enabled Carrington to provide that analysis.
Nevertheless, Carrington deserves credit for perceiving the follies of
yesteryear in current American foreign policy. While the public often catches
references to the past in the media, it rarely meets with the stories behind
them. Spreading America's Word helps bridge the gap between modem
problems and historical experience. It is a great disappointment that many of
its lessons are lost in the narrative.
Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and Incentives. By Judith G.
Kelley. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. Pp. xiii, 276. Price:
$35.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Ahmet Bayazitoglu.
In Ethnic Politics in Europe, Judith Kelley addresses a crucial issue in
international affairs: why, when, and how countries internalize and comply
with international norms. Kelley, an assistant professor of Public Policy
Studies and Political Science at Duke University, investigates this vital
question by focusing on four Eastern European countries: Latvia, Estonia,
Slovakia, and Romania. As representatives of the post-communist nations
reintegrating into Europe, these nations negotiated for membership in three
prominent multi- and transnational European institutions in the 1990s: the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of
Europe (CE), and the European Union (EU). This intriguing comparative
framework is at the center of Kelly's generally successful book. Her choice of
precisely these four countries as the exemplary cases, however, remains
largely unexplained, as does her selection of other factors for analysis.
Kelley conducts her investigation through the prism of "ethnic politics."
As she puts it, "Ethnic issues subject institutions to a stringent test, because
ethnic reforms are generally more difficult for international actors to influence
than technical or economic reforms" (p. 4). She posits that ethnic issues pose
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unique challenges by implicating the "core identit[ies]" of these states,
especially since in this period all four overthrew communist rule (p. 4). For all
its problems, the ideology of socialist solidarity had mitigated or suppressed
nationalist yearnings. In contrast, with few exceptions, post-communist
instability made ethnic minorities natural targets of majoritarian nationalistic
politics of resentment across Eastern Europe.
Given this sensitive ethnic situation, the history Kelley ably recounts is
remarkably positive. In all four countries, despite domestic pressures, the
engagement of the European institutions Kelley examines contributed to the
deflation of ethnic strife and liberalization of the political culture. In Chapters
One and Two, she argues that when these institutions used normative pressure
alone, governments rarely acted to ameliorate the conditions of minorities in
the face of domestic opposition to liberal ethnic policies. Only by adding
membership conditionality to normative pressure did the institutions convince
the countries in question to legislate, and to a lesser extent, implement policies
that at least constituted compromises between the aggressive nationalistic drift
of the domestic scene and the ideals of full minority rights. It is noteworthy
that the benefits of conditionality became apparent and norms were
internalized over time even when there were strong signs at first that domestic
politicians did not agree with the proposals of their international interlocutors.
The success of conditionality, then, rests on a "rationalist set of assumptions
that defines actors as cost-benefit-calculating, utility-maximizing creatures"
(p. 8).
In Kelley's framework, it comes as no surprise that the EU, with its
concrete and certain benefits of membership, has been the most effective
institution in influencing these countries. By moving the candidacy of a
country along step-by-conditional-step, the EU helped shape domestic policies
and even provided cover for domestic political actors as they implemented
relatively liberal policies. What is surprising is that the deeper involvement of
institutions either lacking or foregoing conditionality measures has also
resulted in progress, albeit uneven, in different countries and with regard to
different issues within the same country. Both the OSCE and the CE accepted
these countries as members relatively quickly (the CE admitted Estonia,
Romania and Slovakia in 1993, a mere four years after the fall of the Berlin
Wall, followed by Latvia in 1995) and only then attempted to influence
domestic policies. However, as Kelley is quick to acknowledge, these models
of engagement have been mutually reinforcing. For example, Max van der
Stoel, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, functioned as
the de facto EU expert on minority rights. Notwithstanding the
Commissioner's skill and energy in engaging with these countries, the EU's
support lent his negotiations the power of an implicit conditionality.
To investigate this complex process, Kelley constructs an impressive
empirical model. She bases her conclusions on data from sixty-four distinct
cases from these four countries, all related to issues that together comprise
"ethnic politics." These include citizenship criteria, language requirements
(including use of minority-language names), and education and voting rights.
In every case study, Kelley attempts a "thick" synchronic and diachronic
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depiction by considering the level and form of international engagement, as
well as domestic factors such as the strength of opposition to minority rights,
the involvement of minority parties in governing coalitions, and the influence
of leadership figures. Then, in a series of regression analyses, she tests her
premise of the significance of conditionality. This theoretical and empirical
framework is clearly the most impressive part of this work and sets a high
standard for delineating the elements and influence of international
engagement. By emphasizing the complexity and dynamism of politics,
Kelley succeeds in going well beyond the typical reductive monochromatic
studies that focus on the interaction of a single institution with a single
country around a single issue.
With the theoretical framework in place, Kelley explores each state's
approach to ethnic problems. The two Baltic states, for example, faced nearly
identical challenges posed by the presence of a large Russian minority. In
Latvia, while international pressure and norm internalization worked well
generally, an unanticipated consequence was that nationalists put up a strong
fight for language laws that discriminated against Russian-speakers in order to
salvage a victory of some kind after concessions in other areas. Similarly,
greater confidence about eventual EU membership left Estonia less concerned
about criticism of its language policies. Diminished expectations also
influenced the process. The ambivalence of the Meciar regime in Slovakia
about integration into Europe and Romania's pessimism about eventual EU
membership rendered both countries less responsive to institutional pressure,
even when conditionality should have clarified the benefits of harmonization.
These cases exemplify the complexities and wealth of detail in Kelley's
account.
However, Kelley's success in simultaneously considering a multitude of
factors also amounts to a weakness: the more Kelley delves into the nuances
of her narrative, the clearer it becomes that even more factors could have been
included. Many other institutions could figure in this study, particularly the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Similarly, the more Kelley delves into the
details of domestic politics, the harder it becomes to systematize the findings:
with so many contingent factors and actors, it is difficult to be confident about
any lessons drawn here beyond the unsurprising conclusion that conditionality
has more impact than normative pressures alone. Kelley's final chapter is an
indirect and incomplete acknowledgement of this difficulty as she evaluates
alternative factors and explanations for the outcomes mapped out in her work
such as the significance of nearby "motherlands" for the various minority
populations. The book suffers from these weaknesses despite its wealth of
data and admirable attempt at a nuanced model of international engagement.
Despite at times losing sight of the forest for the trees, Kelley provides a rich
panorama of European integration that should serve students and scholars in
political science well, and point the way, especially in its quantitative
sophistication, for other studies that will fill in the gaps.
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Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of
Humanitarian Aid. By Sarah Kenyon Lischer. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2005. Pp. 204. Price: $35.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Kristen
Eichensehr.
Dangerous Sanctuaries presents a cogent and well-supported challenge
to the prevailing wisdom about refugees and the spread of violence. Tackling
the important task of explaining the factors that determine whether the
movement of refugees will cause violence to occur, Sarah Kenyon Lischer
debunks what she terms "socioeconomic" explanations, prevalent among aid
workers, for the spread of refugee-related violence. The socioeconomic
explanations predict that four factors will cause bloodshed to accompany
refugee movement: location of refugee camps near the border of the refugees'
home state, large refugee camps, the presence of a high percentage of young
men in the refugee population, and poor living conditions. However, through
well-chosen case studies of Afghan, Rwandan, and Bosnian Muslim refugees,
Lischer demonstrates that the socioeconomic explanations, singly or in
combination, do not accurately predict when violence will spread.
Instead, the author argues that "political context" is the determining
factor, within which she identifies three relevant components. First, she
discusses "the origin of the refugee crisis" (p. 10). Lischer argues that refugee
groups that are fleeing general chaos and destruction are the least prone to
violence, while those escaping from group-based persecution are more prone
to violence. Groups fleeing defeat in civil war and aiming to establish a state
in exile, such as the Rwandan Hutu refugees in the Congo, have an extreme
proclivity for violence. Second, Lischer argues that "the policy of the
receiving state" determines whether violence will spread because, if the
receiving state is able and willing to demilitarize refugees, secure its borders,
and maintain the civilian nature of refugee camps, then refugees will be
unable to spread violence (p. 10). Lischer offers contrasting examples in the
Afghan case. She argues that violence occurred among refugees in Pakistan
due to Pakistani sympathy with the refugee cause, but violence did not spread
in Iran, because the refugees there were strictly controlled by state authorities,
who were generally unsympathetic to their desire to attack the reigning
Afghan government. A similar situation resulted with Rwandan refugees.
Violence spread among refugees in the Congo due to the Congolese
government's unwillingness and inability to stop militarization and cross-
border flows, but did not conflagrate among Rwandan refugees in Zaire
because that state's government made a concerted effort to demilitarize
arriving refugees and police the refugee camps.
Dangerous Sanctuaries's most controversial argument is Lischer's third
political context factor: "the influence of external state and non-state actors"
(p. 10). She argues that international aid, despite good intentions, can facilitate
the spread of violence by feeding militants, supporting their dependents, and
legitimizing the status of militant groups as refugees. The author's policy
prescriptions primarily call on the international community to take better
account of the political context and become cognizant of which refugee
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groups are more likely to become violent. However, she also suggests that
international organizations should be aware of the implications of their
"humanitarian" actions and work harder to differentiate between militants and
civilians, while also reserving the option of withdrawing all humanitarian aid
if the human costs of doing so would be less than the costs caused by
maintaining aid in a situation where aid facilitates greater violence (p. 143).
Dangerous Sanctuaries convincingly debunks the socioeconomic
explanations that have been the prevailing wisdom. Yet while the political
context explanation that the author suggests clarifies the problem, it is not a
solution. For example, in the name of "reducing the spread of civil war" (p.
151), Lischer suggests that humanitarian organizations should partner with
entities, such as the police or army of the receiving state or United Nations or
regional peacekeeping forces, which can demilitarize refugees. While such
humanitarian coordination with security entities would be useful, the greater
difficulty is not the lack of cooperation but rather the absence of security
forces or their unwillingness to disarm the refugees as they arrive. Lischer
also suggests that humanitarian organizations should support non-militant
refugee leaders. Alternatives to militant leaders are objectively beneficial in
reducing the likelihood of violence, but there may be a fine line for
humanitarian organizations between supporting existing non-militant leaders
and trying to create alternatives to the militant leaders, which would be a
direct intervention into the political affairs of the refugees. In either case, the
humanitarian organizations would risk endangering the non-militant leaders
and their followers if the militant leaders felt threatened and took action
against their non-militant challengers. These political interventions by
humanitarian organizations have significant costs.
Lischer's study of refugees is lacking in one salient respect-namely,
her failure to produce or include evidence from refugees themselves about
their perception of the conflicts in which they are involved. In addition to
academic sources, the author relies primarily on interviews with officials of
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. Ironically, it is these very officials
that the author argues misunderstand the causes of refugee-related violence.
Some of the interviews with U.N. officials were conducted in areas the author
profiled, including Tanzania and Croatia, but Dangerous Sanctuaries presents
no evidence that the author interviewed refugees in these areas during her
visits. The book's argument would have been strengthened if the author could
have included the voices of refugees, whether concurring in the author's
conclusions or at least rejecting the socioeconomic explanations, such as poor
living conditions in the refugee camps. Refugee interviews would also
humanize the book and temper its academic tone. An additional complication
with the author's explanation for refugee-related violence is that in rejecting
the socioeconomic explanations in favor of political context explanations, she
moves from easily quantifiable factors, such percentage of young men in
refugee camps, to more nebulous factors, such as the origin of the refugee
crisis. Her political context explanations, though theoretically persuasive, are
more difficult to prove convincingly than the socioeconomic explanations are
to refute.
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Dangerous Sanctuaries also fails to offer a full treatment of the
Palestinian refugee predicament. Though the author refers to the Palestinian
refugee issue as "[o]ne of the most enduring and violent situations," she
mentions it only in passing (p. 3). The Palestinian situation does not fit neatly
into the author's model because it has endured for so many decades. In
general, the case studies in Dangerous Sanctuaries focus on fairly short-term
refugee crises lasting only a few years or on short-term acute crises within
long-term refugee experiences. For example, in the Afghan case study, the
author focuses on refugees during the Soviet occupation and largely ignores
the continuance of the refugee population throughout the 1990s after the
Taliban came to power. Analysis of the Palestinian refugee experience, though
extremely complicated, would have provided Lischer an opportunity to apply
her explanations to a longer-term refugee problem.
Dangerous Sanctuaries is an important contribution to the literature on
refugees, and its arguments should be heeded especially by humanitarian
organizations and the United Nations in their preparations for future refugee
crises. Though Lischer does not-and no one could-solve the problem of
refugees and the spread of violence, she successfully debunks contemporary
wisdom and offers an alternative explanation that may be useful in avoiding
the spread of violence in the future.
Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats Are Hijacking the Global
Economy. By Moisds Naim. New York: Doubleday, 2005. Pp. 340. Price
$26.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Daniel Noble.
What does the dark side of globalization look like? In Illicit: How
Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats Are Hijacking the Global Economy,
Moisds Naim argues that the rise of transnational illicit trafficking networks is
not only a detrimental off-shoot of globalization, but an increasingly potent
threat to international security. While Naim's account of illicit networks
provides an excellent overview of the problems they pose, and is an
interesting departure from the typical analysis of globalization's benefits, the
book ultimately disappoints because of its failure to provide actionable
recommendations for combating the traffickers.
Naim, the editor of Foreign Policy magazine, proffers a conceptual
framework for understanding how the same phenomena that gave us
globalization also spawned the growth of illicit trafficking networks in the
1990s. Indeed, the operations of today's illicit networks have come to
resemble those of legitimate multinational enterprises. The root causes that
Naim cites to explain the rise of illicit networks-the fall of the Berlin Wall,
the economic liberalization of the 1990s, the growth in global trade, and new
technologies that lowered the cost of international capital market transactions
and communications-are well-documented in other scholarship on
globalization. Naim also concedes that smuggling is not new to the global
economy, but is a perennial feature of trade among nations. He insists,
however, that contemporary illicit traffickers are more potent and threatening
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than their forbears; today's smugglers have been pumped up by the steroids of
globalization.
In an attempt to operationalize his conceptual framework, Naim explains
how illicit "entrepreneurs" have leveraged positive aspects of globalization-
lower barriers to trade, privatization and business deregulation, lower
communication costs, new technologies, and the opening of new markets and
trade routes-as well as a more worrisome development-the proliferation of
failed states-to create more dynamic trafficking networks that thrive in an
increasingly interconnected world. Illicit traffickers no longer operate in the
shadows or in a vacuum; rather, they form symbiotic relationships with
legitimate traders in states in which they operate or with whom they conduct
business. As illicit traffickers amass wealth through smuggling in a variety of
commodities, they entrench their networks in local power structures by
purchasing political influence from corrupt government officials and law
enforcement officers. This infiltration of politics further shields traffickers
from any potential response by governments, who already find themselves at a
structural disadvantage relative to the networks they are trying to bring down.
Naim posits that international terrorism is just one of the most glaring effects
of the empowerment of illicit networks. Other pressing global economic and
security problems-including the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the
persistence of rogue regimes, the rise of regional wars and ethnic violence, the
stability of the international financial system, and environmental
degradation-have their outlet, manifestation, and often their sustenance in
illicit trade as well.
Naim proceeds to overlay his broad conceptual framework onto several
"markets" in an attempt to distill the common characteristics of all
transnational illicit networks. Naim's discussions of the illegal trafficking of
small arms, drugs, human beings, counterfeit goods, money laundering, and
other more exotic goods (like human organs and toxic waste) rely primarily on
anecdotal and other evidence that he has compiled from newspaper articles,
magazines, and personal interviews with law enforcement and other
government officials. Accordingly, while Naim compiles fascinating (and
often frightening) statistics about global illicit trade in these areas, most of his
stories have been reported elsewhere. Furthermore, the many chapters that
Naim devotes to analyzing these markets are more expository than
explanatory. Nevertheless, Naim capably extracts several themes that are
relevant to understanding illicit networks: illicit networks are economic
enterprises motivated by the search for profits, which are driven in large part
by demand; illicit enterprises closely interact with legitimate business
concerns, which helps maintain anonymity and makes illicit operations more
difficult to detect; illicit networks are often shielded, if not supported, by
corrupt state actors; traffickers have traded product expertise for functional
specialty; and illicit networks have been "flattened," thereby increasing their
robustness, agility, and ability to exploit the benefits of globalization.
Having distilled these common elements of illicit networks, Naim turns
his attention to arguing why the rise of illicit networks threatens international
security and how governments are failing to address the threat effectively. In
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Naim's opinion, illicit trade not only occupies an increasing share of global
economic output, thereby undercutting legitimate trade, but it underpins what
Naim views as today's greatest threats to international security. Naim argues
that governments are currently falling, and will continue to fail, in their
pursuit of illicit networks primarily because of a structural defect-that the
law enforcement agencies charged with combating illicit networks are
disparate, insulated, hierarchical bureaucracies that have failed to adapt to the
nimble networks of global traffickers. This is essentially the same critique that
other observers, like Richard Clarke and the 9/11 Commission, have provided
to explain the failure of the United States to anticipate the attacks of
September 11 or respond effectively thereto. Naim also neglects to look
beyond the U.S. government's efforts to combat illicit networks, assuming
that the U.S. experience can be extrapolated to foreign governments. This
simplifying assumption, however, may neglect important nuances in foreign
governments' capabilities and strategies for combating illicit networks, from
which lessons could be learned to improve the U.S. response.
An additional handicap that governments must confront is their desire to
maintain sovereignty, which hinders effective international cooperation and
renders national borders a strategic advantage for global traffickers. Naim
claims that national frontiers pose "asymmetric" challenges because
traffickers factor in the cost and risk of piercing a country's borders, thereby
increasing their profits, while governments' pursuit of traffickers becomes
exponentially more difficult outside their jurisdictions. Regrettably, however,
Naim does not provide evidence of how traffickers "cost out" their operations,
nor does he provide specific recommendations for how the international legal
framework could be modified to facilitate international cooperation and
extraterritorial operations against illicit networks. Further, Naim's cursory
overview of the Bush administration's policy responses to illicit networks
since September 11 is limited to a critique of what he views as the
administration's general neglect of non-state-based threats.
Although Naim's explanation of the complex dynamics of the
relationship between illicit networks and governments seems facially
plausible, his failure to support his argument with little more than general
assertions leaves the reader without an in-depth understanding of how illicit
networks actually operate. While Naim stresses throughout the book that
profits are the ultimate motivating impulse of traffickers, he does not actually
provide an empirical analysis of the economics underlying illicit trafficking.
Indeed, his economic analysis amounts to little more than an assertion that as
long as global demand for illicit commodities continues to grow, illicit
traffickers will continue to find ways to meet it. Nor does Naim provide an
explanatory model for how illicit networks develop counter-strategies to
address government efforts to combat trafficking. Such analyses of the
dynamics of network interactions exist in scholarship on international
terrorism, and Illicit would have benefited from a discussion of how these
models might apply to illicit trafficking.
Given the stylized nature of Naim's discussion of the interaction
between governments and illicit networks and his reliance on "common sense
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and daily observation" for evidence, it is not surprising that the policy
recommendations in Illicit are neither novel nor imminently actionable (p.
222). Naim argues that the burden of dismantling illicit networks must
ultimately fall on governments, not private actors or non-governmental
organizations that possess a moral interest in stopping trafficking. Naim boils
down his recommendations for improving the response capabilities of
governments to a six-step process: deploy new technologies for authenticating
and tracking commodities; bring government agencies together to produce
better-coordinated efforts; implement demand-side policies to reduce the
value of and harm caused by illicit trafficking; improve international
cooperation; stop thinking about illicit trafficking in moral terms; and
empower civil society to fight illicit networks alongside government. While
most of these recommendations seem obvious, Naim's call for a departure
from the "source-based" strategies that the U.S. government has traditionally
pursued in combating illicit networks-particularly in the war on drugs-is
controversial, yet worthy of a more in-depth examination.
Ultimately, Naim's broad generalizations about the nature of illicit
networks and his failure to provide an exacting analysis of the real "state of
play," leave the reader without a deep understanding of the threat posed by
illicit networks or what concrete steps should be taken to combat them. Thus,
it is not surprising when, near the end of the book, Naim admits: "We need
more clarity about who the main players are, what drives them, the political
and social consequences, and what it means that governments have failed to
contain them despite all their massive efforts and expense in doing so" (p.
266). Despite its shortcomings, Illicit serves as an important reminder that the
forces behind globalization create not only opportunities for global
development and prosperity, but also foster an environment in which
transnational illicit trade can thrive. Illicit accomplishes its limited goal of
demonstrating that the consequences of the rise of illicit networks are not fully
understood and that governments must adapt if they are to confront this threat
to international security effectively. After reading Illicit, it is clear that our
understanding of illicit networks would benefit from additional theoretical and
empirical work in this area.
Law Without Nations?: Why Constitutional Government Requires Sovereign
States. By Jeremy A. Rabkin. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2005. Pp. 350. Price $29.95 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Justin Slaughter.
In his new book, Law Without Nations?: Why Constitutional
Government Requires Sovereign States, Professor Jeremy Rabkin offers a
pointed analysis of the reasons why the United States is often reluctant to
comply with international law and organizations as compared to many states
in Europe. Rabkin first critiques international law and the organizations
arising from it as being fundamentally flawed. Rabkin then argues that the
United States's unwillingness to embrace fully international law and all of its
trappings is not only understandable but also justified. International law, in his
view, is becoming increasingly detached from reality and unable to form the
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basis of an enforceable legal system (p. 246). While Rabkin's argument is
both original and intriguing, the book suffers from a number of flaws. Most
notably, the work fails to address fully why the United States has a difficult
time embracing "schemes of global governance" (p. 16). Instead, the author
reverts to trite anecdotes to explain significant intellectual divides between the
United States and much of Europe. Further, the intentionally narrow tailoring
of the book's subject matter and its polemic tone diminish the overall strength
of the book, leaving the reader feeling well-exposed to the opinions on one
side of a very contentious debate, yet less enlightened about international law
more generally.
If nothing else, Rabkin deserves credit for authoring a study on
international relations that is "not a study on international relations" (p. 16).
As the author himself states, Law Without Nations "is primarily about
American ideas of constitutional governance" and is an attempt to explain
why the history and legal traditions of the United States make it difficult for
this country to adopt theories of "global governance"-i.e., world
government-that are in vogue in much of western Europe (p. 16). While the
United States is receptive to some developments of international law (e.g. the
World Trade Organization), the United States and Europe do have drastically
different viewpoints towards key parts of international law. This includes
questions over what powers international organizations have over member
states and "[h]ow much independence a nation can reasonably be expected to
sacrifice" (p. 21).
To explain the roots of the divergence between the United States and
Europe, Rabkin claims that the United States has a unique view of
sovereignty. Since the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community,
which eventually evolved into the European Union (EU), European states
have accepted a kind of dual sovereignty, where both the state's own laws and
the regulations of the EU must be faithfully followed. For Americans, "the
Constitution in itself is the sovereign authority" whose laws are supreme and
exceptional (p. 67). But international law requires that extra-constitutional
delegations and statutes, with no boundaries on their authority, must also be
obeyed. As a result, Rabkin claims the United States is unwilling to throw
itself headfirst into international law and its corollary organizations (pp. 67-
70). While European states now accept a governance system where their own
laws and constitutions are no longer paramount, the United States continues to
assert that its Constitution and laws are the final arbiter of governance.
Echoing the work of other scholars, Rabkin also suggests that this concern for
maintaining full sovereignty naturally bred American isolationism, a
sentiment first expressed in George Washington's Farewell Address's warning
of "passionate attachment" to certain foreign countries (p. 103). Furthermore,
the sheer age of the U.S. Constitution and the emphasis placed on originalist
viewpoints within the American legal system are unique compared to the rest
of the world, resulting in greater concern about damaging the Constitution
through adherence to foreign authorities.
Considering that the United States has, despite these reservations, joined
several international organizations and thus accepted a degree of dual
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sovereignty, the story is much more complex. According to Rabkin, the times
where the United States has deigned to embrace international law are not only
few and far between, but have always been a brief deviation, were supported
only by a portion of the government, and/or were done with the expectation
that the United States would have substantial control over the organization. In
the case of the United Nations, for example, while the U.N. Charter initially
passed with little debate, the Senate effectively gutted the International Court
of Justice that had been crafted by the State Department, stating that the
United States "would always have the last word on the Court's jurisdiction"
(p. 123).
Of course, in Rabkin's opinion, American aversion to international law
is entirely beneficial, as much of international law does not appear to be
effective. Rabkin finds fault with nearly every major innovation and action
related to international law over the last two hundred years. For example,
attempts to protect and improve the environment through the Kyoto Protocol
proved ineffective (p. 147). Also, the EU played a destabilizing role during
the last decade in the Middle East both by endorsing "the Palestinian struggle
'by all means of armed struggle"' and by refusing to support fully the Anglo-
American invasion of Iraq (pp. 155-56). Finally, the creation of human rights
law, which "is not 'real law,"' has had dangerous effects around the world,
"igniting or exacerbating very serious conflicts" by making people believe
consensus exists where it in fact does not (p. 164). For Rabkin, international
law holds no benefits and only makes the world less safe. It requires, at heart,
a belief in the impossible and in magic (p. 237).
Despite the breadth of Rabkin's discussion, however, his book never
truly addresses the roots of the United States's distaste for international law.
Rabkin simply creates a new question: why is the United States so much more
concerned about giving up sovereignty? Rabkin even takes time specifically to
point out other differences between the United States and Europe, such as the
prevalence of guns in American households, our higher level of religiosity,
our lack of a socialist party, and the American polity's support for the "old-
fashioned belief that the most terrible crimes require the sternest punishment"
(pp. 248-49). By the end of the book, it seems that the United States embraces
sovereignty just because the United States is inherently different from Europe,
leaving the reader feeling that Rabkin has failed even to scratch the surface of
the true question.
Yet, the book also has a more insidious answer. Hidden within the
book's passages are also suggestions that the differences derive from inherent
U.S. superiority. Rabkin claims that the United States' ability to maintain a
constitution for over two hundred years means "Americans are likely to prove
less malleable than the docile peoples of Europe" towards replacing the
Constitution with global governance (p. 249). "What preserves the
Constitution is American independence. They cannot be reconciled with
boundless schemes of global governance" (p. 270). And while the author
portrays U.S. citizens as rugged individualists who believe in personal
accountability, he claims that the European followers of international law are
effete and hypocritical. Rabkin criticizes Europeans for not being bold enough
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to intervene against Saddam Hussein's Iraq and for "agree[ing] that terror
attacks on Israeli cities should be lauded, for example, while also agreeing that
the actual condition of human rights in China should not even be studied by
the Commission" (p. 34). Such words, along with throwaway lines such as
"[t]he United States and Britain certainly overthrew a murderous tyranny in
their war against Saddam Hussein in 2003" and "[tihe United States
implemented relatively mild detentions in the wake of the September 11
attack," the vast majority of which are not borne out by the author's citations,
suggest that the author is approaching this topic from a highly partisan point
of view, giving the work the flavor of a screed rather than a scholarly work
(pp. 33-34). Altogether, the author's strident tone makes it difficult to take
much of his analysis at face value, especially when it reverts to old chestnuts
like the notion that the United States is simply more rugged than Western
Europe.
The greatest problem with Rabkin's work is one that exists by design.
Rabkin admits that "the book offers no advice about how to make peace or
how to deal with other global challenges" (p. 16). If international law is a
failure like Rabkin suggests, and he claims that there are only a handful of
benefits to global governance, then it is essential that an alternative be found.
Rabkin, however, refuses to offer even a hint of a viable alternative. Having
thoroughly discredited a world organized around international organizations,
Rabkin has also implicitly undermined a world where state sovereignty is
supreme through his approval of proxy wars during the Cold War and the Iraq
War as attempts to ensure American supremacy. In the end, international law
may require optimistic beliefs about the ability of humans to coexist and treat
each other kindly and could require a revision of views towards national
sovereignty. However, international law still offers the possibility of peace.
Rabkin, however, gives no solution to the problems of international relations
at all, rendering his work little more than a collection of anecdotes, attacks,
and talking points.
NAFTA Revisited: Achievements and Challenges. By Gary Clyde Hufbauer
and Jeffrey J. Schott. Washington D.C.: Institute for International
Economics, 2005. Pp. xvii, 517. $27.95 (Paperback). Reviewed by
Vivek Krishnamurthy.
More than a decade after its adoption, the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) remains as controversial as ever in the United States. At
least until the specter of Indo-Chinese outsourcing was raised during the 2004
presidential campaign, NAFTA was the scapegoat of choice across the
political spectrum for everything that ailed the U.S. economy. Car factories
leaving Michigan for Michodcan? Blame NAFTA. Illegal immigrants risking
life and limb to cross the Rio Grande? Blame NAFTA. Falling wages for low-
skilled workers? Surely competition from Mexico under NAFTA must have
something to do with it.
Given the impoverished state of the American debate on international
trade-long dominated by hysterical figures pontificating without the benefit
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of either facts or figures-NAFTA Revisited: Achievements and Challenges is
a timely and useful corrective. It sets the record straight on the first decade of
the trade agreement that almost everyone loves to hate. The latest in a series
of monographs co-authored by trade experts Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott
of the Institute for International Economics, a Washington, D.C. think tank,
NAFTA Revisited's carefully researched and heavily footnoted pages are
destined to become a standard reference for anyone with a serious interest in
understanding NAFTA rather than fearing it.
Other than its first and last chapters-which present a broad overview of
NAFTA's history and general recommendations for its improvement,
respectively-each of NAFTA Revisited's chapters examines the agreement's
record of achievement, or lack thereof, and corrects one or two widely held
misapprehensions about NAFTA. In these chapters seven major and often
controversial issue-areas are addressed: labor, environment, dispute
settlement, agriculture, energy, automobiles, and Mexico-U.S. migration. In
turn, each chapter reinforces the book's general theme: NAFTA has been a
modest success when judged against its own goals of increasing trade,
employment, and investment in North America, though with the qualifier that
changes are needed for NAFTA to fulfill its promise.
Hufbauer and Schott do a particularly good job of dispelling the
falsehood that free trade in general, and NAFTA in particular, is to blame for
U.S. job losses in manufacturing due to firms fleeing to the low-wage, low-
regulation corporate paradise of Mexico. This fear of a "giant sucking sound"
turned NAFTA into a major issue in the 1992 presidential election, with the
plucky Texas billionaire Ross Perot capitalizing on the worst fears of the Pat
Buchanan Right and the Ralph Nader Left to win 19 percent of the popular
vote. Hufbauer and Schott's conclusion that NAFTA's impacts on U.S.
employment (both positive and negative) are insignificant compared to the
enormity of the American economy, and the regular "churning" that
characterizes the highly flexible U.S. labor market, is reached only after a
careful trawl through reams of labor and trade statistics that unmasks the
various errors in past studies that have pinned job losses (but never job gains)
on NAFTA. Their careful analysis deserves to be the final word on this tired,
old issue, though it is unlikely, given that Hufbauer and Schott's scholarly
tome probably will not be read by the protagonists in the false debate pitting
jobs against trade.
Another common misconception that Hufbauer and Schott challenge is
the notion that NAFTA is somehow responsible for Mexico's lackluster
economic performance since 1994, even when compared to its two northern
NAFTA amigos. The economic orthodoxy that free trade allows developing
countries to grow more quickly and converge on the income levels enjoyed in
the developed world was an important rationale for making NAFTA the first-
ever regional free trade agreement to straddle the North-South divide, and,
indeed, it is the driving force behind the push for liberalization in the current
Doha "Development" Round of World Trade Organization (WTO)
negotiations.
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In the decade since Mexico joined NAFTA, this orthodoxy has come
under challenge. NAFTA was blamed for triggering the peso crisis of 1994-
1995 that slashed Mexican income levels by 7 percent and for precipitating a
crisis in the Mexican countryside as competition from cheap U.S. foodstuffs
drove the rural poor off the land and into urban poverty. With volumes of
economic evidence backing them, Hufbauer and Schott convincingly show
that the peso crisis was really a product of the Mexican government's risky
borrowing policies and that Mexico's NAFTA membership allowed it to
recover much more quickly from the peso crisis than from similar debt crises
during the 1980s.
As for the plight of Mexican agriculturalists, Hufbauer and Schott argue
that this is as much a story of low agricultural productivity and rising demand
for foodstuffs in Mexico as of subsidized, mechanized U.S. agriculture driving
its competition in the developing world out of business. Although painful, a
decline in the economic importance of agricultural and farm employment is
consistent with industrialization in nearly every other country, but as with the
peso crisis, NAFTA has also allowed Mexico to develop an internationally
competitive agricultural sector that exports products duty-free to the United
States and Canada.
"Import Mexican tomatoes, or import Mexican tomato pickers," former
Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari is reputed to have told the first
President Bush at the summit where the decision to negotiate NAFTA was
made. A decade on, the United States has ended up importing plenty of both,
as Mexican goods and citizens surge across the border in record volumes. The
political sensitivities over Mexican migration into the United States and the
general anxiety in this country over border security and national defense in the
post 9/11 era are seen by Hufbauer and Schott as the main impediments to
NAFTA fulfilling its promise of dismantling barriers to trade and investment
in North America. Already, delays at border crossings are posing challenges
for highly integrated sectors requiring just-in-time component delivery and are
retarding the development of production chains that span the breadth of the
continent.
Given that all three NAFTA amigos are fiercely resistant to devolving
their sovereignty to continental governance institutions, Hufbauer and Schott
propose a very modest reform agenda. Their goal is to make NAFTA operate
more efficiently, not to have it serve as the first step towards deeper North
American integration. In other words, they do not see NAFTA as a North
American analogue to the former European Coal and Steel Community. Their
reform agenda consists of two priorities: (1) rationalizing border security and
(2) moving gradually towards a common external tariff for North America.
The second proposal is to get around NAFTA's cumbersome rules of origin,
which make it difficult to trade products assembled from third-country
components within the continent. Other than for some procedural changes,
Hufbauer and Schott do not believe there is much of an appetite for modifying
or strengthening the weak institutions NAFTA created to monitor the labor
and environmental practices of its three members and to settle their disputes,
for the political will is simply not there.
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The major question left unresolved by the book is precisely what will
grab the attention of governments in all three NAFTA countries to make them
pay attention to overhauling NAFTA. The challenge is most difficult in the
United States, where international economic policy is dominated by the
prospect of signing a new Central American Free Trade Agreement and
negotiating a new Free Trade Area of the Americas, rather than in tinkering
with the edges of NAFTA. In the meantime, those interested in duplicating the
successes and avoiding the pathologies of NAFTA's first decade would do
well to consult the most authoritative work on the subject to date.
The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs After
9/11. By John Yoo. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005. Pp.
xxii, 366. Price: $29.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Kenneth Harbaugh.
John Yoo is the kind of lawyer we are supposed to hate. It was Yoo,
after all, who as a Justice Department attorney co-authored the infamous
Bybee Memo that offered legal justifications for torture. One might expect his
first foray into popular writing to offer some specific defense of his policy
recommendations. Instead, The Powers of War and Peace leaves personal
travails aside and dispassionately makes the case for re-evaluating how we
must think about presidential power in foreign affairs.
As an interpreter of the Constitution, Yoo is an originalist-but only to a
degree. He departs sharply from his cohorts in emphasizing understanding
over intent. "It is the original understanding of the document held by its
ratifiers that matters, not the original intentions of its drafters" (p. 28). As
radical as this idea may seem, its philosophical justifications are compelling.
For the nascent Constitution to attain popular legitimacy, it needed something
greater than the Framers' moral authority. The only process capable of
elevating parchment and ink to supreme law of the land was popular
ratification. "Because the approval of the state ratifying conventions gave the
Constitution its life, the understanding of those who participated in the
ratification should guide our interpretation of the text" Id.
Yoo makes the job of the constitutional scholar infinitely more
complicated by expanding the range of source material necessary to illuminate
societal understanding in 1789. He delves deep into state ratifying
conventions, British constitutional theory, and other foundational texts to
reveal "important and long-overlooked insights" (p. 144). His research is so
voluminous that most readers will have to take him at his word. While the
difference between original intent and original understanding may seem
trivial, in that gap Yoo finds justification for almost plenary executive power
over foreign affairs. The president, Yoo argues, has constitutional authority to
wage war and to negotiate, interpret, and end treaties. The only checks are
Congress's control over the public fisc, its ability to enact domestic
legislation, and the ultimate power of impeachment.
Unlike most legal academics, Yoo makes an honest attempt to appreciate
the exigencies of wartime decision-making. By granting the commander-in-
chief sole authority to initiate hostilities abroad, Yoo asserts, the Constitution
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provides for the kind of "swift and decisive presidential action" necessary to
wage and win war (p. 160). Much of Yoo's case depends on deconstructing
the Declare War Clause in Article I. In the late eighteenth century, a
declaration of war served to formalize hostilities, not initiate them. Our own
Declaration of Independence helps make the point. "The Declaration's
importance was not in authorizing combat, but in transforming the legal status
of the [already existing] hostilities between Great Britain and her colonies...
" (p. 150). Yoo further observes that only five formal war declarations have
been issued, even though American forces have engaged in hostilities abroad
"at least 125 times" (p. 12).
Even more compelling than Yoo's historical arguments for preserving
executive flexibility are his utilitarian ones. To defend the nation, a president
must be allowed to respond to attacks without awaiting congressional
approval. Even Yoo's harshest critics rarely dispute this premise. Yet Yoo
points out that "the Constitution itself nowhere describes such a process [for
responding to attacks], nor does it explain how the Declare War Clause and
the commander-in-chief must interact" (p. 152). Unless we are to accuse the
Framers and ratifiers of the grossest oversight, we must assume that such
broad war powers were intended and understood to reside with the executive.
In practice, this is how the Constitution operates.
Contrary to his popular reputation, Yoo does not advocate an all-
powerful executive, even during wartime. He pays great heed to Congress's
unambiguous authority to deny funding for military operations and its ultimate
power to impeach the Commander in Chief. Some legal scholars argue that
fiduciary control cannot function as a meaningful check against presidential
warmaking, because the political cost of withholding war funding is
prohibitively high. Yet Yoo makes clear that we must not confuse "a failure of
political will" with a failure of the Constitution (p. 159). The same lesson can
be applied to the impeachment power. If Congress can muster the will, it can
remove even a wartime Commander in Chief.
While Yoo's analysis of warmaking powers involves novel applications
of his originalist arguments, his discussion of executive power vis-a-vis
treaties is disappointingly mundane. He invokes original understanding
sparingly, then relies almost entirely on textual and structural analyses of the
Constitution, peppered with supportive quotes from the Framers. In arguing
for presidential authority to abrogate treaties, Yoo points to parallels between
the Treaty Clause and the Appointments Clause in Article II, Section 2. With
a brief historical exposition, and some help from James Madison, Yoo argues
that because presidents have authority to remove "Ambassadors" and "Public
Ministers", they must also have authority to terminate treaties (p. 185). But if
parallel textual structure is dispositive, it would also support presidential
authority to remove "Judges of the Supreme Court," who appear in the same
paragraph immediately after Ambassadors and Ministers. Clearly, this
interpretation needs more work.
Throughout Yoo's defense of a dominant executive role in treaty-
making, he professes a deep respect for separation of powers. This holds true
even when it might lead to a diminution of presidential authority. Treaties
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cannot be self-executing, Yoo argues, because the negotiating and ratifying
process is not sufficiently democratic. While this idea may seem at odds with
the Supremacy Clause of Article VI (describing treaties as "supreme Law of
the Land"), Yoo resolves the apparent conflict by returning, albeit briefly, to
original understanding. The Framers and ratifiers understood Article I to vest
sole authority for making domestic law with the legislature. Only explicit
legislation passed by both houses can turn treaties into statutes.
It should come as no surprise that Yoo's analysis of presidential treaty
power is influenced by a strong utilitarian streak, or what he refers to as "The
Lessons of Practice" (p. 11). The U.N. Charter, which the United States
ratified as a treaty, serves as a case in point. According to the Charter, military
force can only be employed in self-defense or with Security Council
authorization. Yet Yoo staunchly defends the use of military force to stop
ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, even though the United States was not threatened
and there was no Security Council resolution (p. 165). President Clinton's
decision to intervene did not violate the Constitution, because absent explicit
enacting legislation, international treaties do not bind a president in the same
way as domestic law. Any other reading would limit executive authority to an
unacceptable degree.
Yoo remains unapologetic in his criticism of one set of treaties in
particular-the Geneva Conventions. Given his storied tenure as a
government official, it would be reasonable to expect at least some zeal when
he addresses the Conventions in his book. But he explains rather too calmly
the rationale for not extending certain protections to individuals captured in
the War on Terror. In doing so, he misses an important opportunity to ask the
larger question: Are the Geneva Conventions relevant at all? In an age of
perpetual conflict, in which American forces face enemies with little respect
for international legal norms, are the Geneva Conventions mere artifacts of an
earlier and more "civilized" form of warfare? Yoo, in failing to tackle this
difficult but fundamental question, does not live up to his reputation for
controversy.
While The Powers of War and Peace is not always an enjoyable read, it
is worthwhile. Yoo's emphasis on original understanding will hopefully
initiate the kind of debate that advances constitutional scholarship.
Unfortunately, his dispassionate treatment of executive power is not likely to
be respected by his more emotional colleagues. Professor Jeremy Waldron in
the Columbia Law Review recently described Yoo's ideas as "a matter of
dishonor for our profession." Yoo is famous for his views on torture, but it is
entirely conceivable that his influence will extend well beyond the arena of
presidential powers. His assertion that constitutional legitimacy derives
ultimately from popular understanding, and not from the Framers' moral
authority or the wisdom of judges, is a potential bombshell. Yoo stops short of
arguing that present understanding might infer new constitutional meanings,
and he does criticize scholars who suggest that real constitutional change can
occur without Article V amendments (pp. 260-62). But if Yoo is correct that
understanding matters more than intent, then why stop the clock in 1789? If
enough Americans can be convinced that the Constitution allows torture, do
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the opinions of judges and law professors still matter? Perhaps this question,
more than anything else, is why so many legal academics hate John Yoo.
